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Laura Phillips Sawyer
California Fair Trade: Antitrust and the Politics
of “Fairness” in U.S. Competition Policy
In the decades beforeWorldWar II, U.S. antitrust law was any-
thing but settled. Considerable pressure for antitrust revision
came from the states. A perhaps unlikely leader, Edna
Gleason, organized California’s retail pharmacists and coordi-
nated trade networks to monitor and enforce Resale Price
Maintenance (RPM) contracts, a system of price-fixing, then
known as “fair trade.” Progressive jurists, including Louis
Brandeis and institutional economist E. R. A. Seligman, sup-
ported RPM as a protection to independent proprietors. The
breakdown of legal and economic consensus regarding what
constituted “unfair competition” allowed businesspeople to
act as intermediaries between heterodox economic thought
and contested antitrust law, ultimately tailoring federal policy
to accommodate state regulations.
U.S. competition policy is generally portrayed as exceptional and id-iosyncratic, resulting from open-ended legislative acts and strict ju-
dicial enforcement, especially when compared to other developed
countries, which lacked such laws until the second half of the twentieth
century.1 It reflects, we are told, Americans’ deep-seated hostility to mo-
nopoly power, which was codified in federal policy with the Sherman An-
titrust Act of 1890.2 The courts then enshrined a faith in marketplace
Among the many people who have helped me think about the issues in this article I would
particularly like to thank Brian Balogh, Charles McCurdy, Olivier Zunz, Gerald Berk, Lou
Galambos, Logan E. Sawyer, Christy Chapin, Herb Hovenkamp, Tony Freyer, Victoria Saker
Woeste, Tracey Deutsch, Marina Moskowitz, R. Daniel Wadhwani, H. Daniel Phillips, Geoff
Jones, Walter Friedman, and several anonymous reviewers.
1 Tony Freyer, Antitrust and Global Capitalism, 1930–2004 (Cambridge, U.K., 2006);
William Kovacic, “Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: Conver-
gence or Divergence?” in Competition Policy in the EU: Fifty Years On from the Treaty of
Rome, ed. Xavier Vives (Oxford, 2009), 314–43; William Kovacic, “The Modern Evolution
of U.S. Competition Policy Norms,” Antitrust Law Journal 71 (Jan. 2003): 377–478.
2 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209.
Business History Review 90 (Spring 2016): 31–56. doi:10.1017/S0007680515001063
© 2015 The President and Fellows of Harvard College. ISSN 0007-6805; 2044-768X (Web).
competition and reinforced the fear of monopoly power that became a
hallmark of U.S. attitudes and regulatory impulses.3 This story,
however, belies the unsettled and contingent history of U.S. competition
policy and neglects the variety of approaches used to regulate competi-
tive markets.4 Recent revisionist accounts in business and legal history
have begun to reframe U.S. competition policy as a contested terrain
of compromise and accommodation between open market competition
and efforts to manage competitive practices.5
The creation of the legal category of “unfair competition” in the early
twentieth century challenged the idea that the public good was best pro-
tected by market competition. Historically, rather than U.S. competition
policy exclusively protecting market competition to achieve efficiency
and low prices, state and federal policies often protected competitors
as a means to preserve competition while producing more equitable out-
comes through the democratic process. Louis Brandeis—the renowned
“people’s lawyer,” crusader against “bigness,” and Supreme Court
Justice—helped coin the term “fair trade” to rebrand Resale Price Main-
tenance (RPM) contracts, amuch less palatable term.6 Fair trade allowed
3William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman
Antitrust Act (Chicago, 1965), 3; Hans Thorelli, Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an
American Tradition (Baltimore, 1956), 609.
4On the conventional narratives of antitrust law that emphasize law and policy being
“settled” in the 1910s, see Martin Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capital-
ism, 1890–1916: The Market, the Law, and Politics (Cambridge, U.K., 1988). Sklar interprets
the law as favoring big business to the detriment of other democratic goals. See also Robert
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York, 1978). Bork argues
that the law is necessarily consumer oriented, favoring efficiency and low prices, regardless
of structural implications for the economy.
5 Edward J. Balleisen, “The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States: A
Historian’s View from the Early Twenty-First Century,” in Government and Markets:
Toward a New Theory of Regulation, ed. Edward J. Balleisen and David A. Moss (Cambridge,
Mass., 2010), 443–81; Richard John, “Robber Barons Redux: Antimonopoly Reconsidered,”
Enterprise & Society 13, no. 1 (2012): 1–38; William Novak, “Law and the Social Control of
American Capitalism,” Emory Law Journal 60 no. 2 (2010): 377–405; William Novak, “The
Public Utility Idea and the Origins of Modern Business Regulation,” in The Corporation
and American Democracy (Cambridge, U.K., forthcoming); Gail Radford, “From Municipal
Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional Factors in the Shaping of American Public Enter-
prise,” Journal of AmericanHistory 90 (Dec. 2003): 863–90. See also Kenneth Lipartito, “The
Antimonopoly Tradition,” University of St. Thomas Law Journal 10 (Apr. 2014): 991–1012;
Richard C. Schragger, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants
of the Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940,” Iowa Law Review 90 (Mar. 2005): 101–84.
6 Louis Brandeis, “ShallWe Abandon the Policy of Competition?” Case and Comment (Feb.
1912): 494, and “Cut-Throat Prices—Competition that Kills,” Harper’s Weekly, 15 Nov. 1913,
573; To Prevent Discrimination in Prices and to Provide For Publicity of Prices to Dealers
and The Public: Hearings on H.R. 13305, Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess. (1914–1915) (testimony of Louis Brandeis);
Gerald Berk, Louis D. Brandeis and the Making of Regulated Competition, 1900–1932 (Cam-
bridge, U.K., 2005). On “associationalism,” see Ellis Hawley, TheNewDeal and the Problem of
Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, 1966).
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manufacturers to set retail price floors and require particular services for
brand-name goods.7 For Brandeis, fair trade meant protecting proprie-
tary associations, which in his view were little different than labor
unions or agricultural cooperatives.8 The Supreme Court, however, dis-
agreed. In 1911, it held that those arrangements fostered horizontal com-
binations of retailers and facilitated price-fixing—practices deemed
anathema to American antitrust policy.9 Historian Thomas K. McCraw
sided with the Court, famously dismissing Brandeis’s support for RPM
contracts as naïveté generated by ignorance of basic economics.10 Bran-
deis and proponents of fair trade, however, were concerned with more
than economic efficiency. Their fight to overcome the Court’s per se pro-
hibition of RPM agreements shows how businesspeople acted both as or-
ganizational entrepreneurs and as conduits to disseminate new ideas
about competition policy. Ultimately, proponents of fair trade pushed
trade associations into a new role as intermediaries between citizens
and the state, giving them a public regulatory purpose while also expand-
ing the state’s regulatory powers.
Historicizing the arguments for resale price-fixing does not, of course,
resolve the debate over the merits of these arrangements, but rather dem-
onstrates the historical contingency of U.S. antitrust law and its depen-
dence on economic thought as mediated by businesspeople. Rather than
being “settled” in the early twentieth century, or reflecting some timeless
preference for free market competition, American competition policy has
responded both to shifts in economic thought and to political activism.11
Determining the competitive effects of various types of business arrange-
ments could not be determined by an intrinsic American preference for a
particular type of economic organization. Those determinations required
economic reasoning and calculation by some impartial body, replacing
7The use of “fair trade” throughout the article refers specifically to how actors used it at the
time, not a more generally applicable or timeless meaning.
8 See Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), Brandeis dissent.
9Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Park & Sons, Inc., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For the case over-
turning Dr. Miles as based on outdated economics, see Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). See also Lester Telser, “Why Should Manufacturers
Want Fair Trade?” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (Oct. 1960): 86–106; Richard Posner,
“The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 127,
(Winter 1979): 925–48; Bork, Antitrust Paradox, 107–16; Kenneth Elzinga and David Mills,
“Leegin and Procompetitive Resale Price Maintenance,” Antitrust Bulletin 55 (June 2010):
349–92; andHerbert Hovenkamp, “Leegin, the Role of Reason, and Vertical Agreement” (Uni-
versity of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10–40, College of Law, University of Iowa,
Iowa City, 2010). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673519.
10 Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis
D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, Mass., 1984). “Brandeis offered
regulatory solutions grounded on a set of economic assumptions that were fundamentally
wrong” (p. 84).
11 See Sklar, Corporate Reconstruction, 106, 173.
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fixed categories of market competition or regulated monopoly with new
understandings of imperfectmarket competition. Fair trade reforms to an-
titrust law required the development and adoption of a new economic logic
by a heterodox group of economists, known as the institutionalists, as well
as on-the-ground coordination of trade associations that leveraged their
political power along with the ideas of the institutionalists. Those twin de-
velopments altered the trajectory of American regulatory structure, ex-
panding the reach of the “rule of reason” in antitrust law, which allowed
greater flexibility in business organizations and regulatory frameworks.
The crisis of the Great Depression precipitated a rush of experimentation
in economic regulation, bringing into sharp focus competing interpreta-
tions of free versus fair competition.12
The origins of the California Fair Trade Act of 1931—later referred to
as the “Little NRA” in reference to the NewDeal’s National Recovery Ad-
ministration (NRA)—represented the culmination of fair trade activism
dating back to the 1910s. Yet California was unique: its competition law
and policy openly fostered cooperative practices that the U.S. Supreme
Court had declared illegal in interstate trade. The problem of federalism
thus created the opportunity for organizational entrepreneurship, a task
that the unlikely business leader and independent pharmacist Edna
Gleason embraced. This article emphasizes the instrumental role that
Gleason and her colleagues played in the passage of the California law.
The first section examines the small-town origins of the California fair
trade movement.13 The following section demonstrates how Gleason
and her colleagues transformed a populist movement into a sophisticat-
ed statewide price stabilization plan carried out by private associations,
public regulators, and economic experts. The final section explores how
through the 1930s nearly every state passed similar acts—even duplicat-
ing a typo in California’s original law—and those statutes survived both
the Supreme Court’s evisceration of the First New Deal and President
Franklin Roosevelt’s reversal of cartelization policies in the later
1930s.14 Fair trade products and networks faltered under the postwar
onslaught of low-cost consumerism and inflation, having thrived under
12Herbert Hovenkamp, Opening of American Law: Neoclassical Legal Thought, 1870–
1970 (New York, 2014), 206–14.
13Historical accounts of RPM have focused exclusively on national law and policy to the
detriment both of local law and actors and of the contingency of economic thought. See, for
example, Joseph Cornwall Palamountain, The Politics of Distribution (Cambridge, Mass.,
1955); Thomas K. McCraw, “Competition and ‘Fair Trade’: History and Theory,” Research
in Economic History 16, no. 1 (1996): 185–239.
14On President Roosevelt’s reversal from cartelization policies to antitrust enforcement,
see Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War
(New York, 1995). For example,U.S. v. Socony VacuumOil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) reaffirmed
the Court’s hostility toward combinations affecting competitive prices; the Court struck down
practices that had been sanctioned by the FTC less than a decade earlier.
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conditions of scarcity and deflation. Nevertheless, the fair trade story
demonstrates how the breakdown of legal and economic consensus
regarding what constituted unfair competition allowed well-organized
interest groups to facilitate greater experimentation in policy and law.
Ultimately, these businesspeople acted as intermediaries between het-
erodox economic thought and contested antitrust law, creating a more
tailored approach to industrial organization and regulation.
Origins of California Fair Trade
The California fair trade movement really began with Edna Gleason,
a self-trained and state-certified pharmacist, who in the late 1920s
became known as the “mother of fair trade” (Figure 1). She owned and
operated three drugstores in Stockton, California, the first of which she
and her husband had opened in 1915. His death left her as the sole pro-
prietor and manager, a task she embraced with aplomb. In a rapidly
changing retail market, Gleason confronted new types of competition
from chain stores and what were then known as pineboards: discount
outlets that often sold overstocked brands at bargain prices. Neither of
the new competitors sold prescription compounds or offered medical
advice; however, the brand-name goods that they advertised at cut-
rate prices presented a major threat to the traditional pharmacist’s
bottom line.15 This section introduces Gleason and her early efforts to
organize local businesspeople in response to the retailing revolution.
In a town of roughly forty thousand inhabitants, Gleason focused on
advertising her pharmacy as locally owned, community oriented, and
most of all, not a chain store.16 After her husband’s death she renamed
her store “Tom Gleason’s” to “avoid giving out the big-chain impres-
sion.”17 She also offered medical advice, delivery services, and prescrip-
tion compounding—services not offered by department stores. Gleason
also cultivated a reputation for providing indigent community
members with medical advice and services.18
15 “Gleason Taken by Death,” Stockton Record, 15 Mar. 1922, 3; Otis R. Tyson, “‘I Had to
Have More Stores’ So Said Edna Gleason,” Pacific Drug Review [hereafter PDR], May 1931,
n.p.; “Edna Gleason Seated by Council: Councilwoman Is Cut-Rate Foe,” Stockton Record,
23 Oct. 1951, 1. Unfortunately, Gleason did not leave personal papers, making it difficult to
speculate on her motivations. Due to the length constraints of an article, the author has
elected to reserve commentary on Gleason’s gendered role in the fair trade movement for
the book manuscript from which this article has been derived. Laura Phillips Sawyer, Ameri-
can Fair Trade: Proprietary Capitalism, Networks, and the “New Competition,” 1890–1940
(Cambridge, U.K., forthcoming).
16 John Moody, Moody’s Analyses of Investments (New York, 1920), 4:123.
17 Tyson, “‘More Stores.’”
18 Alice Jean Matuszak, “Edna Gleason: Dynamite from California,” Pharmacy in History
40, (Jan. 1998): 85–92. The author interviewed Professor Matuszak, who had previously
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In the 1920s, she identified three threats to the longevity of her busi-
ness: chain store price competition, rising rent costs, and downtown
parking problems. The latter two she countered by opening two addition-
al stores in newer neighborhoods close to the trolley line. Price competi-
tion, however, became the centerpiece of her decades-long activism for
fair trade. Already, national and regional trade associations of retail
druggists published prescription formulas and recommended retail
prices. In an authoritative study of U.S. drug regulation, economic histo-
rian Peter Temin has shown that very little price variance existed in com-
pounding.19 Fair trade sought to extend price controls to brand-name
medicines and toiletries.
While pharmacists offered customers advice and expert prescription
compounding, chain and department stores began carrying similar
brand-name toiletries.20 In the 1920s, the retailing revolution came of
age when chains and department stores spread across America, offering
Figure 1. EdnaGleason. Photo courtesy of the University ofWisconsin Institute for theHistory
of Pharmacy, Madison, Wisc., c. 1929.
interviewed several people who worked with Gleason. They attested to Edna Gleason providing
free health care advice and products to poor members of the community. Carmen Spradley,
“The Gleason House: Serving the Medical Needs of the Homeless,” San Joaquin
Magazine Health and Medical Guide 2011, 36–39, accessed 20 May 2011, http://issuu.com/
sanjoaquinmagazine/docs/medguide_issuu_final.
19 Peter Temin, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States (Cambridge,
Mass., 1980), 60.
20 Ibid.
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lower prices on a wide range of goods.21 East Coast chain stores, like the
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (A&P), and department stores, like
R. H. Macy’s, pioneered a business model that captured profits by com-
bining high-volume sales with lower profit margins. Most of these retail-
ers purchased goods from a variety of manufacturers. High-throughput
manufacturing revolutionized consumer products from processed foods
(e.g., Campbell’s Soup) to cigarettes (e.g., American Tobacco).22 Taking
advantage of manufacturers’ economies of scale, these new retailers up-
rooted the existing distribution system, tilting economic power toward
large-scale retailers and away from the networks of regional manufactur-
ers, wholesalers, and local retailers.23 Many manufacturers also com-
plained that they had lost control of their brands.
Chain stores, such as Owl Drug or Walgreens, pursued retailing
tactics similar to the variety grocery chains, like A&P and Ralph’s
Grocery Company. These firms relied on bulk wholesale purchases
from either a producer or a jobber, though the latter was increasingly be-
coming displaced by direct sales. Historians have emphasized how the
retailing revolution created consumer demand through extensive
brand advertising campaigns and grand openings of new stores.24 Cer-
tainly, chain stores captured consumers’ attention, offering reduced
prices on brand-name goods by increasing their volume of sales. Manu-
facturers and independent retailers, however, did not back down from
the challenge; they contested the rise of chain stores and their discount
counterparts.
For Gleason, however, chain stores were not exactly the problem. In
fact, many chain stores joined the fair trade movement. Instead, she and
her fellow independent retailers identified pineboards, as they were
known on the West Coast, as the major threat to their livelihood.
These discount outlets were sometimes chains, but not all chains were
pineboards. The distinctive feature of the pineboard was its ability to
offer brand-name products at prices below the manufacturers’ retail
network, undercutting even the chain stores. Typically, outlet stores
21Nelson Lichtenstein, The Retail Revolution: How Wal-Mart Created a Brave New
World of Business (New York, 2009), 18–22.
22 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: TheManagerial Revolution in American Busi-
ness (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).
23 Susan Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the American Mass Market
(New York, 1989), 15–21.
24U.S. Federal Trade Commission [hereafter, FTC], Chain Stores: Growth and Develop-
ment of Chain Stores (Washington, D.C., 1932), ix–x. Over a forty-three-year period
through 1928, the FTC estimated that approximately 51,565 new chain stores were opened
and 6,475 stores were acquired by chains. Acquisitions rose in the period between 1928 and
1930, bringing the percentage to 15 percent of the total. On creating consumer demand, see
Roland Marchand, Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–
1940 (Berkeley, 1985).
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lowered their fixed costs by occupying low-rent commercial space on a
temporary basis to test competitive waters. Outlets could also lower var-
iable costs of labor by employing unskilled, low-wage laborers rather
than trained pharmacists. Costs were further reduced as these stores re-
quired cash payments and did not offer delivery services.25 Rather than
offering prescription drugs requiring a registered pharmacist, these drug
outlets sold more basic consumer goods. Pineboards were alleged to
practice predatory pricing, or sales below cost, in an effort to force tradi-
tional retailers out of business.26
Gleason’s arguments against pineboards emanated from her appeal
to local control, economic independence, and self-regulation of compet-
itive markets. In 1927, Gleason entered into her first contest with a so-
called pineboard. In response to R. L. McMaster opening Kut-Price
drug outlets in Fresno, Stockton, and Modesto, California, Gleason
launched a campaign to coordinate Stockton’s Independent Merchants’
Association to open the town’s first cooperatively owned discount drug-
store, aptly named Bed Rock Drug Store.
By pooling local resources, Bed Rock advertised aggressively
and mimicked the no-frills sales approach of Kut-Price.27 The
major difference, of course, was the reputation of the Independent
Merchants’ Association. By October, Gleason had bought out the
Kut-Price store and liquidated its merchandise.28 The “Stockton Plan”
demonstrated the feasibility of competitors forming a market-based
collaboration while preserving service competition and minimizing
direct price competition.
By the end of the decade, the limits of cooperation and control
through an independent cooperative had been reached in Stockton.
Gleason then turned to the state association to rally retailers behind
the banner of fair trade. Her activism elevated her through the ranks
of the state trade association toward a new position advocating for
state regulation.
25 “Who’s Your Competitor? What Is This New Type of Competition Commonly Called the
‘Pine-Board’ Store?” PDR, Apr. 1931, n.p.
26 “Below-cost pricing” refers to selling a good below its average variable cost, which may
include the cost to purchase from amanufacturer or wholesaler as well as labor costs. If done in
an effort to drive competitors out of business, this is referred to as “predatory pricing.” See
Philip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under
Section 2 of the ShermanAct,”Harvard LawReview 88 (Feb. 1975): 697–733; Eric Rauchway,
“TheHigh Cost of Living in the Progressives’Economy,” Journal of AmericanHistory 88 (Dec.
2001): 898–924; Marc Levinson, The Great A&P and the Struggle for Small Business in
America (New York, 2012), 136, 142, 147.
27 “Beating ‘Pineboards’ to the Punch,” PDR, May 1930, n.p..
28 “California,” PDR, Nov. 1930, 23.
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From Populist Organization to Progressive Regulation
As early as the 1910s, the high-volume, low-margin business model
came under attack by people like Edna Gleason and her allies; their fair
trade movement rendered the retailing revolution more contingent than
was conventionally thought.29 Over two-thirds of retail services contin-
ued to be provided by independent proprietors with low capitalization.30
These independents were well coordinated, connected, and active.
Despite collective action challenges to such a dispersed and diffuse
group of businesspeople, and federal antitrust prohibition of price-
fixing, the retail druggists—first in California—launched one of the
most formidable campaigns of the early twentieth century to regulate
consumer prices of ordinary goods.
Advocates of fair trade envisioned a strong state association that
would publicize standardized price lists and monitor member compli-
ance. The publication of monthly price lists would, they argued, allow
businesspeople and regulators alike to monitor price changes. This ap-
proach was modeled after the U.S. National Formulary, established in
1888 by the American Pharmaceutical Association to standardize com-
pounding formulas and their input prices.31 As representatives of a pro-
fession, the pharmaceutical associations endorsed tougher regulations
on prescription compounding, licensure exams, standardization of col-
leges of pharmacy, and ownership rules for pharmacies. As business
owners, the pharmacists pushed for price schedules to create transpar-
ency in retailers’ buying, marketing, and sales.
The success of the Stockton Plan brought Gleason into contact with a
well-known San Francisco pharmacist and lawyer, W. Bruce Philip, who
proved a natural ally. Through the 1920s, Philip led efforts by the Amer-
ican Pharmaceutical Association (APhA) to modernize retail manage-
ment. As a professor of pharmacy at the University of California, he
advocated revising curricula to better educate students on modern mer-
chandising and cost accounting, a first step toward price transparency
29 See also Tracey Deutsch, Building a Housewife’s Paradise: Gender, Politics, and Amer-
ican Grocery Stores in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, 2010).
30 Strasser, Satisfaction Guaranteed, 65; Melvin Copeland, Principles of Merchandising
(New York, 1924).
31 Edward Kremers and Glenn Sonnedecker, Kremers and Urdang’s History of Pharmacy
(1940; repr., Madison, Wisc., 1986), 275; Temin, Taking Your Medicine, 24–30. In 1906, the
National Formulary (NF) was adopted by the federal government as an official document of
compounding formulas. The NF was modelled after the U.S. Pharmacopeia; in 1975, the two
standard-setting organizations merged. See Lee Anderson and Gregory J. Higby, The Spirit
of Voluntarism: A Legacy of Commitment and Contribution: The United States Pharmacope-
ia, 1820–1955 (Rockville, Md., 1995); Gregory J. Higby, ed.One Hundred Years of the Nation-
al Formulary: A Symposium (Madison, Wisc., 1989).
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and standardization.32 Under Philip’s guidance, the APhA endorsed the
federal fair trade bill, which had been stalled before the U.S. Congress for
decades.33
Since the late 1890s, the Supreme Court had interpreted antitrust
law as prohibiting contracts that facilitated horizontal combinations of
competitors.34 Despite the development of the “rule of reason” test,
which allowed the Court to weigh the competitive effects of a business
arrangement, the Court in 1911 strengthened its opposition to contracts
that might promote horizontal cooperation, creating the per se prohibi-
tion of such agreements.35 The Court refused to consider the intent or
competitive effects of any such networks; it did, however, remain
divided on how best to protect competitive markets. Rather than a
strict rule, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. believed the “rule of
reason” should be applied in cases involving the cooperative standard-
setting by trade associations or small proprietors. Brandeis, the
“people’s lawyer” who joined the Supreme Court in 1916, formulated a
similar rule, which the majority implemented in 1918.36 The Court re-
mained divided between strict constructionists and liberal activists.
Brandeis actively supported the fair trade movement, arguing that
antitrust should allow trade associations of independent proprietors to
pool their buying, marketing, and sales power to rival chain store com-
petitors.37 In doing so, the independents mimicked many of the cost-
cutting strategies of the chains while preserving the large number of
competitors. Brandeis and others also favored greater regulation of
unfair trade practices, which included sales below cost, secret rebates,
and advertising allowances. In other words, in the view of Brandeis
and other fair trade advocates, the legislature should determine the pa-
rameters of “fair competition” and the courts must investigate the partic-
ular facts relevant to the industry and the “evils believed to exist.”38
32 See the following by W. Bruce Philip: “Increasing Net Profits by Increasing Average
Sales,” Journal of the American Pharmaceutical Association [hereafter JAPA] 17 (June
1928): 576–80; “Conference of Teachers of Commercial Pharmacy,” JAPA 17 (Oct. 1928);
“The Right Side of the Show Case,” JAPA 18 (Aug. 1929): 818–19; “A New Faculty Member,”
JAPA 19 (Apr. 1930): 388–90.
33 “The Department of the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy,” JAPA 18 (Mar.
1929): 284–89.
34U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), striking down a rail-
road combination.
35Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 373.
36Chicago Board of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231 (1918), upholding private association rules
affecting prices; Tony Freyer, Regulating Big Business (Cambridge, U.K., 1992), 112–13,
191–92.
37Gerald Berk, “Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the American
State, 1911–1929,” Social Science History 20 (Dec. 1995): 380–81.
38Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
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While federal courts embraced strict prohibitions against horizontal
cooperation of businesses or laborers, California competition policy went
in the opposite direction. That state fostered some of the earliest cooper-
ative efforts of union laborers and farmers. As early as the 1860s, Califor-
nia labor unions and craft guilds used a union label campaign to improve
their working conditions, as well as to denounce immigrant laborers,
child labor, and tenement production facilities. Xenophobia animated
these campaigns to a large extent.39 Nonetheless, California courts en-
forced the sales provisions attached to the union labels. Registered col-
lective marks spread beyond labor unions to include winemakers,
farmers’ cooperatives, fruit growers, and butchers throughout the
state.40 Farmers in the citrus and raisin industries pioneered associa-
tional techniques to control supply and distribution, using both legal
and extralegal means.41 Raisin growers, for example, initiated standard-
ized grading, packaging, and shipping. They established an incorporated
exchange, where crops were deposited, loans could be issued, and sales
were made across the country. The farmers’ “benevolent trust” also
relied upon violence and intimidation to punish detractors and deter
outside competitors.42 In the United States, collective and certification
trademark laws, which were popular throughout Europe, depended on
state law and enforcement.43
When California codified its competition policy in the early twenti-
eth century, it maintained its distinctive history. California antitrust
law focused on penalizing concentrations of capital, exempting combina-
tions of laborers, farmers, and independent proprietors from prosecu-
tion.44 Moreover, the California Supreme Court established that
specialty producers’ minimum retail prices would be enforced despite
39 John Brooks, “The Trade Union Label,” Bulletin of the Department of Labor 15 (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1898): 197–221; Cal. Stats. (1863), 79–80, sect. 353–57; Paul Duguid, “A Case of
Prejudice? The Uncertain Development of Collective and Certification Marks,” Business
History Review 86 (Summer 2012): 311–33.
40Victoria Saker Woeste, The Benevolent Trust: Law and Agricultural Cooperation in In-
dustrial America, 1865–1945 (Chapel Hill, 1998); Charles Postel, Populist Vision (New York,
2007).
41Woeste, Benevolent Trust, 179–81.
42 Ibid. See also Elizabeth Hoffman and Gary Libecap, “Institutional Choice and the Devel-
opment of U.S. Agricultural Policies in the 1920s,” Journal of Economic History 51 (June
1991): 397–411; and Lawrence Shepard, “Cartelization of the California-ArizonaOrange Indus-
try, 1934–1981,” Journal of Law and Economics 29 (Apr. 1986): 83–124.
43Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Revise the Statutes Relating to Patents,
Trade and Other Marks, and Trade and Commercial Names (Washington, D.C., 1900):
349–51, 103. The Lanham Act of 1947 granted trademark status in federal law to collective
and certification marks.
44 California passed the Cartwright Act in 1907; amendments in 1909 exempted laborers,
marketing associations, and any agreement “the object and purpose of which is to conduct
business at a reasonable profit.” California Business and Professions Code (Deering’s Califor-
nia Codes), Sect. 16700–758, 16703, 16723, 16724 (San Francisco, 1944).
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contrary federal antitrust developments.45 California courts insisted that
associational product development and control was a legitimate protec-
tion of brand-name goodwill, retail networks, and consumers’ interest in
quality and safety.46 According to the federal law, if a producer wanted to
affect retail policies, then hemust own his own retail stores (i.e., vertical-
ly integrate); however, in California, producers could make retail-sales
agreements with networks of retailers, allowing each entity to remain in-
dependently owned though cooperatively managed.47 Other states fol-
lowed California’s formulation of antitrust law by exempting farmers,
laborers, and independent proprietors conducting business to maintain
“reasonable prices.”48
Despite the autonomy of state laws within intrastate commerce,
federal antitrust jurisprudence still loomed over private actions as well
as state law.49 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example,
went after San Francisco–based Hills Brothers for price-fixing its fair
trade coffee.50 Hills had maintained a nationwide retailer network for
its high-end vacuum-packed coffee since the early 1920s.51 Trouble
arose when the discount grocer Piggly Wiggly advertised Hills coffee as
a loss leader, flouting its wholesale and retail contracts to maintain “rea-
sonable prices.” The FTC found that Hills’s systematized record-keeping
coupled with its refusal to deal with noncompliant retailers had the in-
tended effect of fixing prices.52 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
tained the power to invalidate all or part of the California codes, as
they did in Colorado.53 Thus, the problem of federal antitrust
45Charles P. Grogan v. H. G. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611 (1909), upholding manufacturer-set
minimum prices because of an absence of intent or power to monopolize; Ewald Grether, “Ex-
perience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting,” California Law
Review 24 (Sept. 1936): 640–700.
46Goodwill refers to the value of the brand name and its association with quality or price.
FTC, Report on Resale Price Maintenance (Washington, D.C., 1929), 1:45, 18; FTC, Report on
Price Maintenance (Washington, D.C., 1931), 2:8, 10, 13; Roy Johnson, William Ingersoll, and
Gilbert Montague, The Control of Resale Prices (Chicago, 1936), 120–36.
47Woeste, Benevolent Trust, 111–12.
48 See Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swenson, 76 Wash. 639 (1913); and Colo. Sess. Laws,
1913, c. 161.
49 See People v. Sacramento Butchers’ Association, 12 Cal. App. 471 (3d Dist. 1910), up-
holding the California antitrust act.
50Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9 F. 2d 481 (1926).
51Mark Pendergrast, Uncommon Grounds: The History of Coffee and How It Trans-
formed Our World (New York, 2000), 150–51, 164, 217.
52Hills Bros., 485. The Court found that Hills’s records of price-cutting discount chains
constituted an effort to restrain trade, making any refusal to deal with Piggly Wiggly nearly
impossible.
53Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927), striking down Colorado’s “reasonable
price” provision as too vague. The California Supreme Court upheld the Cartwright Antitrust
Act in Spegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34 (1946).
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prosecutions presented a major hurdle to the expansion of associational
business activity in California.
In February 1929, Gleason and Philip led efforts to coordinate a
unified, statewide initiative for legislation to strengthen the “reasonable
price” provisions of California law. First, they reorganized the California
Pharmaceutical Association, consolidating two regional associations into
a more formidable single entity.54 Association dues supported monthly
price bulletins and lobbying in Sacramento. The bulletins included
standardized prescription compounding and pricing, uniform cost-
accounting methods, and manufacturer-set fair trade price schedules.55
A system of open bidding would allow firms to compare costs, prices,
bids, and contracts on medicines and consumer brands. The state
journal also advertised fair trade products, price lists, and locally
owned retailers who agreed to abide by the standardized service poli-
cies.56 In the summer, the association announced a system ofmonitoring
to be launched.57
Initially, enforcement of the voluntary price plan operated through
the pharmaceutical associations, but these efforts at partial planning re-
quired state complicity. Pharmacists pressured manufacturers to adver-
tise and enforce fair trade sales contracts that set price schedules and
service guarantees. Retailers then policed one another, to maintain
price levels and service agreements, and reported detractors to their
local association and the manufacturer. Manufacturers were then to
pressure pineboards and department stores to abide by those same
sales contracts or they would be blacklisted, though keeping or publish-
ing such a list was against federal law.58 Lacking much enforcement
power, the committee needed state enforcement, which was uncertain
given that most drugs and toiletries traveled across states lines into
California.
The California Pharmaceutical Association’s 1930 meeting demon-
strated the limitations to self-regulatory price stabilization plans. Edna
Gleason took center stage.59 L. N. Brunswig, president of Brunswig
Drugs, allegedly dumped unsold products to cut-rate retail outlets. He
acknowledged that his wholesale company sold items to cut-rate
54 “California United,” PDR, Feb. 1929, 13.
55 The PDR published a ten-part series, called “Prescription Pricing,” throughout 1930.
56 “ArmandDefends Sales Policy,” PDR, May 1929, 106; G. L. Sorenson, “Profit and Success
in Independence,” PDR, Mar. 1930, n.p.; McKesson & Robbins advertisement, “Write to Your
Congressman,” PDR, Apr. 1930, n.p.; “Los Angeles and Southern California: Cut Prices and Cut
Profits,” PDR, May 1930, 120; E. J. Clary, “Right Competition Is a Stimulant,” PDR, Aug. 1929,
20.
57 “Convention of the California Ph. A.,” PDR, July 1929, 36–42, 39.
58Hills Bros.
59 “California A. Ph. A. Convention,” PDR, July 1930, 22.
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dealers in Stockton and Fresno. Gleason, who “apparently [came] to the
convention determined to open up this question and have it thoroughly
discussed,” accused Brunswig of misrepresentation and predatory prac-
tices. Brunswig denied the accusation, but Gleason’s fellow Fair Trade
Committee members defended her allegations.60 It was men like Bruns-
wig, they believed, who threatened the network and had caused recent
falling prices. Heated discussion revealed that discount pineboard
chain stores in southern California had traveled to Chicago and
New York to circumvent jobbers and wholesalers who required fair
trade contracts.61
As a result of both continued price deflation and the “most vitriolic
[meeting] on record,” the California Fair Trade Committee focused on
legislation to make mandatory its codes of fair competition.62 The asso-
ciation also began to address ways in which the FTC’s trade-practice con-
ferences and ongoing chain-store investigation might aid their cause.63
With the onset of the Great Depression and the momentum against big
businesses, a number of chain drugstores and out-of-state producers
began publicly advocating for codes of fair competition.64 (An effective
countermobilization had yet to arise, excluding the federal-level lobbying
by department store Macy’s and litigation against RPM contracts.)
The FTC’s trade-practice conferences, begun in 1926, illustrated
both the possibilities and the legal limitations of association efforts to
manage competition. These conferences brought together businesses
within a single industry to voluntarily coordinate information on pro-
duction, orders and bids, distribution costs and services, and prices.65
FTC commissioners presided over these meetings and approved associ-
ation “submittals” that circumvented Department of Justice antitrust
prosecutions, but the FTC failed to reach internal consensus. In 1929,
the FTC issued a report that called for greater administrative oversight
of competitive practices while also questioning the stabilization effects
of such rules.66 Nevertheless, the information shared at trade-practice
60 “Relieved Druggists Forget Program in Cut-Price Uproar Chain-Store,” Los Angeles
Times, 26 June 1930, 12.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.; “California Appoints Fair Trade Committee,” PDR, Nov. 1930, 25.
63 “Trade Ethics,” PDR, May 1930, 16–17. Congress ordered the FTC to conduct a study of
chain stores and their relation to independent proprietors in addition to a study of public util-
ities. The results of the chain store investigation were released in two parts: The first, in 1931,
advocated for experiments in RPM under FTC oversight. The second, in 1933, stated that RPM
was not workable and instead endorsed uniform prohibitions on loss limitation provisions and
codes of fair competition outlawing, for example, sales below cost.
64 “The Winds Change,” PDR, May 1930, 13.
65 FTC, Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission (Washington, D.C., 1927),
186–94.
66 FTC, Report on Open-Price Trade Associations (Washington, D.C., 1929), xxi, 78–79.
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conferences provided a blueprint for trade associations to institute
standardization guidelines and codes of fair competition, addressing
sales below cost and price lists.67
Although the Supreme Court continued to limit the FTC’s authority
to define unfair competition, the appointment of Harlan Fiske Stone to
the bench bolstered Brandeis’s cause.68 Shortly after Stone’s appoint-
ment, the Court extended Brandeis’s previous “rule of reason” decision,
applying it to a hardwood lumber association.69 In both administrative
procedure and legal precedent, new avenues were opening up for price
stabilization plans.70
The confluence of falling retail prices, growing associational power,
and increasingly permissive competition policy attracted neophytes
prominent in business, law, and economics.71 In July 1930, for
example, Lehn & Fink, manufacturers of Lysol, the first brand-name dis-
infectant in the U.S. market, joined the fair trade bandwagon.72
Company president Edward Plaut announced a “comprehensive cam-
paign designed to induce the public to trade only at those retail stores
where fair retail prices prevail and to encourage the retail druggists of
the country to maintain fair trade retail prices.”73 Advertisements
flooded the Saturday Evening Post and Collier’s women’s magazine.
After traveling to Europe, Plaut believed that European competition
policy might provide a model for the United States.74 As the chairman
of the New York Board of Trade, he commissioned two economists to
study price maintenance policies. Professors Edwin R. A. Seligman of
Columbia University and Robert Love of City College of New York
67 See FTC,Millwork Industry, Trade Practice Conference [hereinafter TPC] (Washington,
D.C., 1928), 140, 143 [circulation of price lists], 143 [later rescinded].
68FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), limiting FTC power to determine what constituted
unfair practices; American Column Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377 (1921), striking down trade asso-
ciation information-sharing practices on costs and prices as intent to fix prices; FTC
v. Ralamdam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), limiting the FTC to proscribe only conduct directly
related to competitive practices. The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 later extended the reach of
FTC jurisdiction to “unfair and deceptive practices.” Freyer, Regulating Big Business, 112–
13, 175–78, 192–94, 218–23.
69Maple Flooring Manufacturers’ Association v. U.S., 268 U.S. 563 (1925), upholding as-
sociation information sharing on prices and output.
70 “Sherman Act Conspiracy Theory in Resale Price Maintenance Cases,” University of
Chicago Law Review 30 (Summer 1963): 766–83.
71 “Price War Wages Merrily,” PDR, July 1930, 20.
72 “Lehn & Fink to Undertake Fair-Price Campaign,” PDR, July 1930, 64; for brief descrip-
tion of the company, see Lehn & Fink Products Co., Lehman Brothers Collection, Baker
Library, Harvard Business School. http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/lehman/company.html?
company=lehn_fink_products_co.
73 Ibid.
74 “EuropeHasMet Price Cutting,” PDR,Nov. 1930, 20; “NARD to Consider Philip Survey,”
PDR, Apr. 1931, n.p.; H. S. Noel, “Pacific Drug Review Survey Excites Comment from
Easterner,” PDR, Apr. 1931, n.p.
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released their study in 1932; they recommended strengthening the right
of refusal to sell, expanding the FTC trade practice conferences, and for-
malizing federal oversight through legislation.75 At the time, Columbia’s
economics department housed some of the most vociferous proponents
of “institutional economics”—a progressive school of economics that
supported managing competition through public-private partnerships.
The institutionalists rejected neoclassical economists’ models of
perfect competition and instead argued that market imperfections re-
quired empirical study and regulatory interventions.76
Carl Weeks, president of the Armand Company, testified before the
FTC in favor of national fair trade legislation. Weeks hired Charles
Wesley Dunn, who had defended Colgate’s and Beechnut Packing Com-
pany’s price protection plans, to write Armand’s fair trade contracts.77
Dunn, who also served as counsel to the American Pharmaceutical Man-
ufacturers’ Association, proposed that the FTC be given the regulatory
power to determine “unfair trade practices,” using uniform pricing
data collected by associations.78 E. R. Squibb & Sons also joined the cam-
paign.79 Curtis Beach, the staff economist at the California Pharmaceu-
tical Association, suggested that the printing industry’s success in
standardizing uniform cost-accounting methods could act as a model
for pharmacists.80 Columbia economics professor Paul Olsen instructed
the association to gather the necessary cost and pricing information to
demonstrate its need for legislation to permit and enforce uniform ac-
counting standards.81
The Fair Trade Committee, in 1931, sought a remedy to what they be-
lieved was an information problem caused by inaccurate cost accounting
at the firm level and insufficient coordination statewide. The committee
announced plans to partner with the Census Bureau for a drug distribu-
tion survey covering the Pacific slope states: California, Washington,
Oregon, and Utah. Problems arose immediately.82 Gleason argued that
the survey failed to differentiate among types of stores or locations.
Only in a handful of cities did survey participants and local
75 Edwin R. A. Seligman and Robert Love, Price-Cutting and Price Maintenance: A Digest
(pamphlet, n.d.) and Price Cutting and Price Maintenance: A Study in Economics (New York,
1932), 479–84.
76Malcolm Rutherford, “Understanding Institutional Economics: 1918–1929,” Journal of
the History of Economic Thought 22 (Sept. 2000): 277–308, 290.
77 “Volunteer Fighters,” PDR, June 1930, n.p.
78 Front matter on Capper-Kelly bill, PDR, Jan. 1931, 1.
79 R. D. Keim, “The Economics of Price Standardization,” PDR, Aug. 1930, 19.
80 Curtis L. Beach, “What Price Prescriptions?” PDR, Mar. 1931, 18–20.
81 “News of the Associations,” PDR, Nov. 1930, 84.
82 F. C. Felter, “Drug Distribution Census,” PDR, Apr. 1931, n.p.
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administrators compare medicinal products and prices across various
categories of drugstores.83
Gleason and Philip organized their own statewide survey, which
reached over 1,200 California druggists and cataloged manufacturer
and retailer prices on over one hundred trademarked goods and com-
pounded prescriptions.84 On the latter, prices varied little among phar-
macists in urban and rural areas. On trademarked goods, pharmacists
were asked to identify competition they felt in their local area, namely,
from department stores and pineboards. The survey cataloged falling
prices, sales, and employment in independent drugstores. It also encour-
aged druggists to write in their complaints against special advertising al-
lowances, quantity discounts, and rebates given to large retailers in their
survey responses or to send them in a letter directly to their representa-
tives.85 What the druggists needed to demonstrate to the legislature was
that independent proprietors were being denied the ability to earn a rea-
sonable profit. The survey identified trade practices found to “generate
and perpetuate predatory price cutting” that diminished independents’
market share.86 It suggested that prices and the submittal process led
to easier monitoring of outlet sales. Finally, the state association asked
that each firm submit a written notice to both the California general as-
sembly and theNational Association of Retail Druggists (NARD) “stating
the firm’s position in respect to the [federal] bill” before Congress.87 Its
report argued that sales below cost, secret rebates, and advertising allow-
ances generated price wars that exacerbated deflation and unemploy-
ment, especially for independent proprietors who were less likely to
have reserve capital or to be able to switch product lines easily.88
While the NARD continued to pursue a type of self-regulation akin
to price-fixing, the Californians had done something slightly different.
Gleason, Philip, and their association of pharmacists lobbied the state
legislature to expand its police powers, in a time of economic emergency,
over ordinary businesses trying to maintain reasonable profits. What
they wanted was the setting of minimum price provisions by manufac-
turers, with feedback from retailers, a vertical restraint permissible by
law. Moreover, the Board of Pharmacy would review and approve the
codes generated through trade association deliberation. This regulatory
83 Ibid.
84 “Philip Survey,” PDR, Apr. 1931, 10.
85 Ibid., 1.
86 “Criticism Requested,” PDR, July 1931, n.p.
87 “Philip Survey,” 11; “Philip Survey ‘Goes National,’” PDR, Oct. 1931, 11. Seventeen state
pharmaceutical associations issued similar surveys.
88 “The Seligman Price Survey,” PDR, Dec. 1931, 18, 30.
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beachhead transformed the initial self-regulationmovement and led to a
different trajectory in the early 1930s.
Their efforts to reorganize the state association, collect complaints,
and publish price statistics and feedback proved fruitful. In the
summer of 1931, the state legislature passed the Fair Trade Act.89
Gleason later recalled her experience of conducting the survey with
Philip and presenting the results to the assembly: “I left my store one
day with only a toothbrush for baggage. I didn’t get back for six weeks.
I talked to druggists and grocers in every county in the state. And they
talked to their legislators. . . . We got the law!” 90 Unfortunately, the leg-
islature held closed sessions; still, the bill has been widely regarded as
the result of the pharmacists’ lobbying.91 The California Fair Trade
Act of 1931 replicated national proposals that exempted fair trade
agreements from antitrust prosecution; however, it relied on
state police powers over intrastate trade.92 “Articles which are trade-
marked and which are competitive with articles of a similar nature, if
manufactured in California, may be price-protected in that
state through contracts between the local producer and local
distributors.”93 Further, consumer goods “in fair and open competition
with commodities of the same general class” could be controlled by
price contracts, stipulating that “the buyer will not resell such commod-
ity except at the price stipulated by the vendor.”94 The independents had
secured a bill that they believed would eliminate unfair methods of
competition.
The Fair Trade Act attracted businesses to California.95 The Miles
Medical Company, for example, announced that it “now has established
a branch in California to test the legality of the Junior Capper-Kelly
bill.”96 Albert Beardsley, president of the Miles Medical Company, re-
ported that his staff sent out over four thousand contracts to jobbers
and retailers requesting their participation in the Miles price stabiliza-
tion plan. Increasingly, companies began to advertise in trade journals
and newspapers, endorsing fair trade agreements and protective
89Eugene C. Brokmeyer, “News from the Nation’s Capital,” PDR, July 1931, 54.
90 Stuart Nixon, “Hawkins’ Challenge of Fair Trade starts ‘Rumble’ from ‘Mother’ of Act,”
Stockton Record, 23 Feb. 1950, 21, 36.
91National Recovery Administration [hereafter, NRA], Work Materials, No. 17: Tentative
Outlines and Summaries of Studies in Progress (Washington, D.C., 1935), 374–75.
92 Amendment to the “Unfair Competition Act,” Cal. Stats. 1913, at 508–510; Brokmeyer,
“News from the Nation’s Capital,” 54.
93 “Interstate or Intrastate?” PDR, Aug. 1931, 10–11.
94 “California’s Capper-Kelly Bill,” PDR, July 1931, n.p.; Cal. Stats. 1931, p. 583.
95 “Miles Incorporates California Company,” PDR, Nov. 1931, 13–14; “Majority Sentiment
Favors Resale Price Maintenance,” PDR, Nov. 1931, 76.
96 “Southern California Elections,” PDR, Jan. 1932, n.p.
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legislation.97 The Miles California Company, a new subsidiary of the
Miles Co., reported overwhelming cooperation but anticipated that it
would wind up in court to enforce the agreements.98 Indeed, by the fol-
lowing summer, the company had sued two well-known cut-rate retail-
ers, the Sontag Drug Co. and Thrifty drugstores, and settled out of
court.99 The constitutionality of the act was not questioned.
California Fair Trade, Unfair Practices, and the “Little NRA”
The California fair trade law expanded state police powers to regu-
late retail prices through private trade associations coupled with public
regulatory oversight; this public-private approach to managing price
competition came to exemplify Depression-era regulation. President
Roosevelt, who entered office on March 4, 1933, attempted to institute
similar regulation at the federal level; however, without a federal
police power, the regulation of industrial and consumer prices fell
under the auspices of national commerce power. The federal government
had the power to regulate interstate commerce, but intrastate businesses
would be untouched by Roosevelt’s regulations.100 This made state coop-
eration with federal code authorities imperative. The 1930s reframed
what constituted reasonable regulation of prices at the state and
federal levels.
Continued price deflation, business closures, and unemployment
through the early 1930s had galvanized both antimonopoly sentiment
against large-scale corporations and demands for managed competi-
tion.101 By 1933, prices had fallen by 20 percent, manufacturing output
had declined by a third since 1929, and unemployment had reached 25
percent.Manyworkers had their hours cut andwages reduced. The phar-
macists were not alone in seeking aid to manage markets. Across the
states in the early 1930s, legislatures created administrative boards
under emergency conditions to control competitive practices, wages,
and retail prices on an industry-by-industry basis.
Roosevelt’s advisers were steeped in the antimonopoly tradition and
institutionalist economics.102 Attempting to maintain a certain level of
97 “Operating Entirely within the Law,” PDR, Dec. 1931, n.p.
98 “Price Protection Plans Progress,” PDR, Mar. 1932, n.p.
99 “Malicious Merchandising,” PDR, June 1932, 22. Richard W. Longstreth, The Drive-In,
the Supermarket, and the Transformation of Commercial Space in Los Angeles (Cambridge,
Mass., 1999), 166; “To Operate under Fair Trade Act,” PDR, March 1933, n.p.
100Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), striking down a national child labor law as
a regulation of intrastate trade. This case stood in contradistinction to Champion v. Ames, 188
U.S. 321 (1905), upholding the commerce power as plenary.
101 “Liggett Is Bankrupt,” PDR, May 1933, 16; NRA, Work Materials No. 17, 376–77.
102 Raymond Moley, Seven Years After (New York, 1939), 5.
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fiscal conservatism, the First New Deal instituted “partnership in plan-
ning” between government and “organized private industry” under the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).103 Regulators at the NRA ex-
tended themodel of the FTC trade practice conferences to set mandatory
codes of fair competition, intended to cease price deflation through mit-
igating oversupply and controlling retail prices.104
Several states responded, California being foremost among them. In
1933, California enacted two laws to strengthen its codes of fair compe-
tition and to extend them to other industries.105 An amendment to the
Fair Trade Act extended fixed prices beyond those parties to the original
contract. It also permitted anyone, not solely the manufacturer that set
the minimum resale price schedule, to bring suit against alleged price-
cutters.106 Secondly, California passed a statute incorporating the NRA
codes of fair competition into state law. Where federal codes did not
exist, the California law allowed code-making authority in intrastate
commerce.107 Other states suspended their antitrust laws; in each of
those states, the codes of fair competition approved by the NRA
carried the weight of state police powers.108 California’s codes of fair
competition included maximum working hours, minimum wages, and
prohibitions on secret rebates and discounts.109 The state’s Board of
Pharmacy became the oversight body to approve codes; however, the
courts retained adjudication power.
TheNRACode of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade did not legal-
ize resale price-fixing per se and, ultimately, the drug trade wanted
103 Franklin D. Roosevelt continued, “these [antitrust] laws were never intended to encour-
age the kind of unfair competition that results in long hours, starvation wages and overproduc-
tion.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Second Fireside Chat,” 7 May 1933. Online by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=14636.
104National Industrial Recovery Act (Pub. L. 73–90, 48 Stat. 195, enacted 16 June 1933);
Hawley, The New Deal, 31–32, 37, 44.
105 For example, “Building Executives Confer on Code for Recovery Act Plans,” California
Highways and Public Works 11 (July–Aug. 1933): 20.
106 Cal. Stats. 1933, at 793.
107 Ibid., c. 1029. Other states enacted similar laws: Ohio, Utah Laws (2d spec. sess. 1933),
c. 21; New Jersey Laws 1933, c. 372; Wisconsin Laws 1933, c. 476; New York Laws 1933, c. 781;
Colorado Laws (2d sec. sess. 1933–34), c. 17; New Mexico Laws 1934, c. 18; South Carolina
Laws 1934, No. 1213; Virginia Laws 91st spec. sess. 1933), c. 61; Washington Laws (1st spec.
sess. 1933), c. 50; West Virginia laws (2d spec. sess. 1933), c. 86; Wyoming Laws (spec. sess.
1933), c. 16.
108Kansas Laws (spec. sess. 1933), c. 78; Mississippi Laws 1934, c. 207; Texas laws
(1st spec. sess. 1933), c. 53.
109 “Tentative Code of Fair Competition Adopted; Edna Gleason Elected to Presidency,”
PDR, July 1933, 20–21; “NARD Code of Fair Competition,” PDR, Oct. 1933, 17, 30; “NRA
Writes Retail Drug Code,” PDR, Oct. 1933, 22–23; “Code of Fair Competition for the Retail
Trade,” PDR, Nov. 1933, n.p.
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stronger codes, not their repeal.110 The provisions were largely procedur-
al, prohibiting loss leaders, advertisements for cut-rate goods, and sales
below cost.111 Otherwise, though, all other demands of the California
druggists and their national counterparts had been met, including an ex-
emption from antitrust regulation.112 Charles Walgreen, owner of the
chain drugstores of that name, helped establish the Drug Institute of
America (DIA), which worked with the NRA to publicize and monitor
codes of fair competition.113 Carl Weeks touredmajor cities campaigning
for local associations to join the DIA.114 Trade association leaders, the
president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Henry Harriman, and
former FTC chairman Nelson Gaskill praised the NRA for rationalizing
and managing competition through partnership.115
Although some members of the Supreme Court had encouraged such
regulatory reforms to antitrust law, United States v. Schechter (1935) in-
validated the law on two grounds.116 The Court held that commerce
powers did not extend to purely intrastate traffic and, moreover, that
the delegation of legislative powers to the executive was unconstitutional.
The ruling, however, did not consider the concerns of consumer welfare
advocates who charged the codes with raising consumer prices; instead,
the Court focused on determining the constitutional parameters under
which the federal government could intervene to effect competitive prac-
tices and prices.
The Court dismantled the NIRA, yet the passage of state and federal
codes of fair competition that outlawed “predatory price cutting” re-
mained within state police powers.117 The Court’s approval of state
police powers to control competitive practices and price outcomes for or-
dinary goods and services was nothing less than a constitutional
110NRA, Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Drug Industry (Washington, D.C., 1933).
The exception was the NRA’s Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1933), art. 5, rule 26. See Lewis Mayer, A Handbook of NRA: Laws, Regulations,
Interpretations, Codes, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1934), sect. 364.
111 NRA, Code of Fair Competition in the Retail Trade (Washington, D.C., 1933), art. 7–9,
sect. 1. The prohibition of sales below cost was strengthened on 29Mar. 1934, by art. 8, sect. 6,
which prohibited sales below the manufacturer’s wholesale list price per dozen items.
112 15 U.S. Codes Supplement VII, sect. 705 (1933).
113 “Drug Institute of America, Inc.,” Druggist Circular 79 (1935): iv. See also Ronald
Hamowy, Government and Public Health in America (Northhampton, Mass., 2008), 154.
114 “Drug Institute Leader in City,” Spokane Daily Chronicle, 2 June 1933, 3.
115 Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York,
2013), 229–30.
116 “To decide it wisely, it is necessary to consider the relevant facts, industrial and commer-
cial, rather than established legal principles.” Justice Louis Brandeis, Boston Store
v. American Gramophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, at 27–28 (1918); Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S.,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
117 See “Developments in the Law—Unfair Competition,” Harvard Law Review 46 (May
1933): 1171–95.
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revolution, which would also affect labor standards, wage legislation,
and consumer prices.118 The year prior to the Schechter decision, the
Court had upheld a New York state law that fixed milk prices for
farmers, dealers, and retailers.119 In Nebbia v. New York, Justice
Owen Roberts, writing for the majority, held that the state had exercised
legitimate police powers by intervening in private markets when the
regular laws of supply and demand had failed to clear markets. Oversup-
ply had exacerbated falling prices, forcing sales below production costs.
Roberts appealed to both economic and moralistic reasoning: “Unfair
and destructive trade practices in the distribution of milk [led] to demor-
alization of prices,” and “unrestricted competition [had been] found to
be an inadequate protection to consumer interest.”120 Such “economic
maladjustments” had made state intervention into private markets nec-
essary to protect the public welfare.121 Justice James McReynolds and
the rest of the old guard dissented. They called the Milk Control Board
illegitimate, because it regulated ordinary, private businesses and consti-
tuted “management control” of markets.122
Not only was the Nebbia ruling crucial to extending police power
regulations over minimum wages and maximum hours, it also proved
critical to upholding the “little NRAs” of states. The Nebbia ruling has
predominantly been used to demonstrate the expansion of state police
powers, which influenced national efforts to expand the regulatory
powers of the administrate state. However,Nebbia relied on antimonop-
oly jurisprudence that protected competitors rather than the competitive
market. In February 1936, the California Supreme Court upheld the Fair
Trade Acts, quoting extensively from theNebbia decision.123 In this case,
a Beverly Hills retailer advertised and soldMax Factor products at prices
below what the company stipulated in its sales contracts. The “chiseler,”
Clarence Kunsman, threatened the distribution network between Max
Factor, a Delaware corporation, and Sales Builder, its California distrib-
utor. The California Supreme Court held that the Fair Trade Acts legiti-
mately prohibited Kunsman’s business methods, which demoralized
trade and diminished the goodwill established in the Max Factor brand.
Previously, judicial review had focused on whether fair trade agree-
ments violated antitrust rules; by the mid-1930s, state laws had shifted
the Supreme Court’s focus to the issues of legislative power and
118 Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional
Revolution (New York, 1998), 7, 78–91.
119Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
120 Ibid, at 518, 538.
121 Ibid, at 538, 503.
122 Ibid, at 537, 554.
123Max Factor & Co. and Sales Builders, Inc. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446 at 455–57 (1936).
The U.S. Supreme Court denied cert.
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economic reasoning.124 The Nebbia ruling had shattered the Court’s tra-
ditional distinction between “businesses affected with the public inter-
est,” which could be subject to price regulations, and purely private
business, which could not.125 After 1934, any business could be worthy
of protection from unreasonable competition. While the state fair
trade laws aimed to correct price-cutting that was deemed predatory,
the laws were also clearly designed to restrict the benefits of economies
of scale achieved by chain and department stores—Gleason’s original
intent. Thus, the real end, much as in the Nebbia case, was to protect
small independent dealers by ensuring a fair profit margin. As Congress
considered a national fair trade law, in the mid-1930s, reports regarding
consumer welfare were mixed.126 Critically, adverse reports did not chal-
lenge the legitimacy of the state’s police power to enact such laws.
What began in antitrust—protecting competitors for the sake of
competitive markets—spread to other economic regulatory domains.
The voluminous state laws passed to protect small and independent pro-
prietors altered federal-level strategies for proponents of both fair trade
and managed markets more generally.127 The NARD and the National
Wholesale Drug Association (NWDA) altered their lobbying strategy
by seeking a federal law that would enable fair trade contracts in inter-
state trade between fair trade states.128 Building on this momentum in
the states, congressmen advanced bills to protect small proprietors.
Despite President Roosevelt’s objections to legislation that mimicked
certain provisions of the unpopular and unconstitutional NIRA, two
bills were passed that institutionalized the fair trade vision for competi-
tion. First, the Robinson-Patman Act (1938), commonly criticized as a
convoluted law, prohibited sales below cost and secret rebates.129
Second, the Miller-Tydings Act (1937) made fair trade contracts enforce-
able in interstate commerce when made between fair trade states.130
124 “Fair Trade Legislation,” Harvard Law Review 49 (Mar. 1936): 811–21; John Barker
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Lacking an administrative apparatus such as the NRA, a tight social
movement—to maintain publicity, monitoring, and policing through the
distribution chain—became all the more important. The druggists
launched national publicity campaigns against department stores,
ramping up pressure on fair trade manufacturers.131 In the post–NRA
New Deal era, however, department and chain stores organized against
fair trade. Macy’s led lobbying and litigation efforts attacking liberalized
antitrust laws and police power regulations that enabled fair trade. Only
a fewmonths after theNebbia decision national business leaders formed
the American Liberty League to oppose the New Deal.132 But for the
druggists, the National Retail Federation and the National Retail Dry
Goods Association proved most formidable. Those associations pub-
lished journals, such as Chain Store Age, that taught chain store
buying, marketing, and retailing practices. Macy’s publicized its
private brands, for instance, as a cheaper alternative to fair trade
goods. Advertisements decried the entire fair trade program as anti-
consumer and sought to take back the meaning of market fairness.133 Al-
though fair trade networks persisted into the post–World War II era,
they depended on private distribution networks, persuasive advertising,
and consumer support. Fair trade and the economics of imperfect com-
petition also came under attack in the academy.134 The University of Chi-
cago’s Free Market Study Group attacked and discredited the
progressive populism of the Robinson-Patman Act, arguing that such
laws were anticonsumer, anti–big business, and anti–free market.135
Consumers, through organized protest and individual purchasing
choices, seemed to agree.136
131Nixon, “Hawkins’ Challenge,” 36.
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Conclusion
Despite its waning popularity in the latter half of the twentieth
century, the fair trade movement significantly contributed to the chang-
ing structure of American regulation during its formative period. The
California fair trade law provided one path toward regulating consumer
markets, through the state’s police powers, that remained consistent
with the Supreme Court’s “rule of reason” jurisprudence. Rather than
self-regulating business associations or top-down administrative rules,
a public-private system of coregulation emerged. This new regulatory
system fostered standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement—
multiple regulatory goals that fit within the reasonableness of the
California fair trade laws.
The hallmark of U.S. competition policy has been the protection of a
competitive marketplace; however, legal categories regarding what con-
stitutes legitimate competition have not remained fixed. Antitrust law
did not act as an exogenous force on business firms and organizations;
instead, businesspeople demonstrated the malleability of U.S. competi-
tion policies over time. The fair trade story demonstrates how business-
people were able to exploit the legal ambiguities of antitrust and
federalism, promote the progressive economics of regulated competi-
tion, and leverage the political power of local elites to significantly
alter state and national law. Ultimately, the druggists helped reorder
competition policy to allow retail price-fixing—what had once been
anathema to antitrust law.
Business law regarding combinations of competitors, therefore, has
proved to be more unsettled and contingent than conventional history
suggests. Reframing this historical understanding calls attention to the
multifaceted demands placed on competition policy. On the one hand,
U.S. antitrust law prohibits anticompetitive behavior and monopoliza-
tion in order to protect market competition and guarantee market effi-
ciencies derived therefrom. According to this consumer welfare
argument, the means of market competition provide the ends of lowest
consumer prices. On the other hand, protecting competition is also
thought to require a robust number of competitors; that threshold
depends not only on the industry but also on one’s historical context.
The goal of low or reasonable prices, thus, combines with the historically
contingent economic and political goals of protecting competitors. In
either scenario, protecting competition provides the means to particular
goals: low prices or decentralized economic power. As policymakers and
jurists try to balance these tensions within antitrust and state police
powers, businesspeople often act as intermediaries of economic ideas
through both litigation and lobbying. The history of capitalism too
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often belies the variety of organizational forms that the U.S. adversarial
system not only showcases but often accommodates. The logic of regula-
tory strategies in this case responded to the institutional environment
and operating frameworks of firms and their associations.
. . .
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